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Has Free Trade Won the War in
Congress, or is the Battle Still Raging
A Study of the Influence of Industry Coalition Building on
Congressional Trade Policy

WendyJ Schiller*
Any attempt to predict or explain congressional behavior on trade policies that affect
the fate of the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA) is a daunting task. During
the past two decades, congressional trade policy veered from an active protectionist
stance in the form of import quotas on textiles and apparel in the 1980s, to a majority
free-trade stance in the form of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and
GATT in the early 1990s, to a modest resurgence of limited protectionism today that has
come about in part as a response to the domestic effects of NAFTA. Although President
Clinton put free trade at the forefront of his economic policies, trade policy is still subject
to enormous cross-pressures from trade-sensitive industries (O'Neill, 2000). One only has
to look at the recent battles over Africa Free Trade, the extension of the Caribbean Basin
Initiative (CBI), and the current debate on permanent normal trade status for China, to
see that the battle between protectionist forces and free-traders is still alive and well in
Congress. '
Traditional approaches to trade politics, from Schattschneider (1935; 1960) to Bauer,
Pool, and Dexter (1963), consider the effects of pressure groups as a primary explanatory
variable for trade policy. In this work, I focus on a revision of the traditional model,
which posits that the localized constituent influence of industries has a great impact on
the policy positions of individual legislators, and in turn, can determine the direction of
U.S. trade policy. Where other works treat single industries as pressure points on congressional policymaking (Destler, 1995; Destler and Odell, 1987), this study examines trade
politics from a different angle, in particular, the decisions made by industries to form or
not to form coalitions, and whether industry lobbying strategy has an impact on members of Congress. Industry lobbyists, acting on behalf of the industries, often serve as

Wendy J. Schiller is an Associate Professor of Political Science and Public Policy at Brown
University. This article was prepared for the Conference on the United States and the Future of
Free Trade in the Americas, March 25, 2000, at Southern Methodist University. In addition to
her work on interest groups and trade politics, she is the author of Politics and Rivals:
Representation itl U.S. Senate Delegations,Princeton University Press, 2000.

1.

For an overview of how Congress has reasserted itself in trade policy over the past two decades,
see Carter (1999).

364

NAFTA: Law and Business Review of the Americas

intermediaries between constituents, congressmen, and senators. As such, their decisions
to work explicitly with other industries can have a direct effect on the content of congressional legislation, and on the responses of the administration to congressional action.
In American politics, industries seeking beneficial trade policies work within a bicameral legislative system. Therefore, industries must make calculations about potential support in the House and the Senate, which, because of differences in geographic apportionment, do not offer the same opportunities for influence. Where an industry or interest
group is located, and whether it is concentrated or dispersed, affects how potentially powerful that industry will be in the House of Representatives and the Senate. Based on the
fact that legislation has to pass both chambers, industries choose whether to form coalitions with other industries or groups in order to pressure legislators to enact legislation. A
coalition is defined as a cooperative effort to secure favorable trade policies. We can identify coalition partners by looking at industry group behavior and the provisions of the
trade bills themselves to identify concrete benefits offered to industries to join coalitions.
As Olson (1993) points out, nations with larger geographic territory will necessarily have
more industries with a stake in trade politics, although protection for any single industry
is not likely to adversely affect the national economy. Given the sheer size of the United
States, one can argue that there are an unlimited number of coalition partners who might
lobby for trade benefits, either through import barriers or open markets abroad.
Importantly though, industries that form coalitions seek to keep the size of their coalition
as small as possible. They are therefore strategic in seeking partners who bring them the
greatest political strength with the fewest economic costs.
Industries assess their strength in each chamber based on their regional concentration
and location. When an industry has strength in both chambers based on political geography, it is not likely to seek coalition partners. In contrast, an industry that is strong in one
chamber but weak in the other will seek coalition partners that complement its strengths
and diminish its weaknesses. An example of the latter case is an industry that is located
across many districts, but not concentrated in states. That industry will be stronger in the
House and will seek out coalition partners who are strong in the Senate. Likewise, industries that are concentrated in states with small or medium populations will be stronger in
the Senate and weaker in the House because a single senator is more powerful due to his
capacity to trade votes, and single-handedly block legislation, than are his colleagues in a
small state delegation in the House of Representatives. Industries that are strong in the
Senate will therefore seek out coalition partners with different geopolitical bases to provide the missing numerical strength in the House. 2
2.

In brief, applying a political geography framework to explaining trade politics makes the following assumptions. First, an industry seeks the strongest support in Congress and the administration for trade policies that it favors. Second, legislators want to secure benefits for an
industry that is located in their district or state because such benefits can translate into electoral support from employers and employees in that industry. Third, industries seeking protection from imports will try to build the smallest winning coalition because there is a cost
associated with including each additional industry partner in the coalition. Industries seeking
free-trade policies will try to build the largest possible coalition but may be limited by the costs
of collective action; they have a finite amount of benefits to offer their coalition partners
because the benefits of free trade are so dispersed. For a more comprehensive discussion of the
theoretical underpinnings of the argument, see McGillivray and Schiller (1996), McGillivray
(1997), and Schiller (1999).
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This approach can be very useful in explaining congressional shifts on trade policy
over the past two decades, and is especially relevant to understanding the dynamics of
recent trade legislation affecting the Americas. 3 In some ways, the explanatory framework
employed here-political geography-runs parallel to both the partisan and social movement explanations of change in U.S. trade policy. Uslaner (1994; 2000) argues that political parties adopt specific policy positions on trade in response to pressure groups aligned
with them, and that shifts in the coalitions that form party majorities can lead to shifts in
party policies on trade. Uslaner explains that the shift in the Republican Party policy
towards a more protectionist trade stance is in part a function of their dependency on
southern conservatives who tend to be more isolationist. At the same time, however, one
might argue that geography is the explanatory variable because these same constituents
live in areas that have been negatively affected by open trade policy, for example, in the
loss of textile jobs in the south. Advocates of social movement theory argue that the
increasingly global nature of domestic economies has given rise to a new and more
intense push for uniform international labor and environmental standards to accompany
international trade agreements (Mayer, 2000). Again, one can peel away the geographical
layers and see that members of the environmental community are perfectly positioned to
argue for interventionist regulation because they also live and work in areas whose
economies are highly dependent on export trade industries. Moreover, members of the
labor community incur no cost in calling for child protection standards in trade partner
countries because such requirements are likely to limit future trade agreements and thus
will protect domestic jobs in industries that cheaper imports have penetrated.
This paper focuses on four main trade-sensitive industries: textiles, agriculture, retail,
and steel. Using a combination of interview data and roll call data, this work traces the
evolution of coalition strategies among industries according to their economic and geographic strengths and weaknesses. 4 The interview data is used to illustrate the process by
which industries decide to enter into coalitions with other industries, and the reaction of
congressional and administrative actors to those coalitions. Congressional roll call data is
displayed in map form to show the patterns of geographic support for specific trade bills
in Congress that reflect the success of industries in securing support for their preferred
trade policies.

3.

4.

To be clear, using the interaction of bicameralism and political geography cannot account for
all the variance in trade policy, that is, levels of protection over time, nor is it a complete explanation for congressional roll-call behavior. Existing works on trade policy and Congress usually focus on explaining roll-call votes in terms of party, ideology, interest group campaign contributions, and constituency pressures (Conybeare, 1991; O'Halloran, 1994; Uslaner, 1994,
1998; Martin, 1995; Bailey and Brady, 1998; Conley, 1999). A smaller set of works uses geographic concentration and firm behavior to explain actual levels of trade protection in the
form of import barriers (Snyder 1989; Busch and Reinhardt, 1999) and argues that the amount
of campaign contributions that firms make to specific members influences their roll-call votes
(Busch and Reinhardt, 1999).
The interviews were conducted at several intervals over the years 1996-1998 for the larger project of which this article is a part. A sum total of nineteen interviews were conducted in person
with one interview conducted over the phone and they include industry lobbyists, Department
of Commerce staff members, staff members in the office of the USTR, and former members of
the House and Senate. A complete list of interviewees is available from the author.
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Over time, the textile industry has entered into coalitions with other industries, such as
the apparel industry, that do not make economic sense. Raising import tariffs or imposing
quotas on fabric increases costs for the domestic apparel industry, yet it still joined forces
with the textile industry for most of the 1980s. Still further puzzling is that some sectors of
agriculture, typically a strong proponent of free trade, joined this broad protectionist coalition in the later half of the 1980s. On the other side of this protectionist coalition was the
retail and export apparel business, and a majority of agricultural industries, which took
longer to establish formal coalitions but did so in time to sustain presidential vetoes of legislated protectionism. In the 1990s, however, the underlying economic conditions of each of
these industries changed, which altered their priorities; such changes lead to the formation
of new and distinct coalitions with different geographic partners. Moreover, industries seeking free-trade policies learned to harness the power of their disparate members into more
coherent and sustainable coalitions in both the House and the Senate.
In contrast to textiles, agriculture, and retail, the steel industry exerted strong and lasting influence over Congress and the Executive branch for the past two decades without
entering into coalitions with other trade-sensitive industries. The steel industry differs
from the textile and apparel industries because its primary route for trade protection is
administrative; steel industry advocates filed unfair trade practice complaints with the
ITC and an antidumping petition with the Department of Commerce. However, when
the administration is not sufficiently attentive to the steel industry, it uses Congress to
pressure the administration into taking action to remedy trade imbalances in the steel
sector, as it did in 1984 and in 1998-1999. One major reason that the steel industry has
sustained its power without forming coalitions with other industries is that it made efficient use of its strength in both the House and the Senate.
This paper analyzes the behavior of these industries during three important periods of
trade policymaking behavior: 1984-1990, 1991-1996, and 1997-2000. Part I explains the
coalition formation behavior of the textile, apparel, retail, and agriculture industries during each of these time periods. Part II explains the steel industry's choice to stay separate
and not enter into formal coalitions with other industries. In each of these time periods,
political geography played a very crucial role in the decision-making process to enter or
not to enter into coalitions with other industries and in their subsequent level of influence in Congress.

I.

1984-1990 Coalition Formation: Protectionist versus Free-Traders.

In the period of 1984-1990, three major textile bills were introduced and passed by
Congress.5 How did a geographically concentrated industry like textiles, defined here as
fabric producers, amass broad political support in the Congress? McGillivray and Schiller
(1996) demonstrate that the success of the textile industry in securing passage of protectionist legislation was in great part attributable to its coalition formation strategy. The
textile industry was primarily concentrated in a few small to medium population states,
with sixty percent of its employment in North and South Carolina, and lightly dispersed
in several others states, including Alabama. This geographic distribution meant that the
5.

These bills were vetoed by Presidents Reagan (in 1986 and 1988) and Bush (in 1990) on the
grounds that they were protectionist and would prompt retaliation by our trading partners.
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textile industry was stronger in the Senate than it was in the House, because comparatively it wielded influence in a small number of congressional districts.
Part of the explanation for congressional approval of three separate quota bills
designed to protect the textile industry lies in the strategy the industry employed to
broaden its sphere of influence in Congress. The textile industry first approached the
apparel industry in 1984 with the argument that both industries were being severely damaged by textiles and clothing imported primarily from the Far East. The apparel industry
is spread throughout the United States, but heavily concentrated in the Northeast.
Together, the textile and apparel industries exerted political strength over senators and
House members in the Northeast and Southeast. Such geographic concentration was still
not sufficient to amass support for a sweeping textile import quota bill in the House.
Lobbyists for both the textile and apparel industries knew they had to find other sources
of support in different regions of the country. One chief textile lobbyist described the
process of coalition building:
Well, there was an informal coalition of organizations that got together to
address our textile trade problems. We were a nucleus coalition, I think we
called it FFACT - Fiber, Fabric and Apparel Coalition for Trade ...

in our

coalition, we had the unions, the ILGWU (International Ladies Garment
Workers Union) and the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers. We also
had the National Cotton Council.. .Having them expanded our reach to
parts of the country where we did not have textiles. We also had the American
Fiber Producers who make synthetic fiber, which is usually oil or wood based.
That... brought in elements of oil companies in a coordinated political way.
By utilizing the resources of the Cotton Council, the textile and apparel lobby added
states like Mississippi and Texas. Likewise, the coalition gained Oklahoma's support
through the addition of the American Fiber Producers. In combining with these other
industries, the textile lobby compensated for their otherwise restricted geographic
influence, and in doing so, became a far stronger political force in both the House and
the Senate.
Having amassed a very solid and broad coalition of industries, the textile and apparel
lobby then proceeded to push for legislation in both the House and Senate. They relied
primarily on Senators Strom Thurmond (R-SC) and Fritz Hollings (D-SC), both of
which were powerful forces in the Senate. A former staff member to Senator Thurmond
described how regional economic interests outweighed partisan differences:
We were bipartisan and that was a benefit. (Party) didn't matter because textile trade knew no political boundaries. We divided up the labor - a group of
many brought various assets to the table. We managed the assets in a way to
give maximum benefit.. .The effort was mainly structured back through the
industry. The industry would be the go-between for everyone. We would
commit to doing something and they would fit it into the larger effort.
To counter a probable filibuster by opponents of the quota bill, the textile and apparel
coalition still sought sixty or more votes in support of their bill. To that end, the industry
coalition pushed further and sought out industries that could provide Senate votes with
little additional cost in the trade benefits that would be provided to them. They succeeded
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in adding quotas for footwear and mining products such as copper. That action resulted in
extending the geographic reach of the bill to Maine and Missouri (footwear), and to western states, including Arizona, Nevada and Utah, thus producing six more Senate votes.
Ultimately, this coalition succeeded in securing passage in both the House and the Senate
of an import quota bill in 1986, only to have President Reagan veto it. As the following discussion points out, the counter-coalition behavior of import-export industries was a large
factor in sustaining the presidential veto.
Just as the textile and apparel industries united to form a complete political power in
the House and Senate to pass quota legislation, the anti-protection forces also formed
coalitions that enhanced their own political geography. Schiller (1999) demonstrates how
the retail industry, which was stronger in the House, joined forces with the majority segments of the agriculture industry (wheat, soybeans, corn), which were stronger in the
Senate, to oppose quota legislation.
In the early part of 1985, there was one major umbrella organization that tried to organize free-trade forces, the Retail Industry Trade Action Coalition (RITAC). However, even
though there were retailers in every district, they were widely dispersed, and that made
organizing them difficult. Moreover, the public arguments for free trade were harder to
make on a district-by-district level at that time. But the subsequent inclusion of footwear
provisions in the textile quota bill brought stronger and more active opposition from the
athletic footwear industry than had existed previously. According to a lobbyist for the
Nike Corporation, it was only after the footwear provisions were added that Nike
increased its efforts to lobby against the quota bill by lobbying members individually, in
addition to being a member of the larger umbrella group.6 In addition, the participation
of Nike brought with it a powerful Senate ally from Nike's home state of Oregon, Senator
Robert Packwood (R-OR), then Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee.
Still, even with Senator Packwood's influence, the free-trade coalition had to attract
industry partners that strengthened its reach in the Senate. They did not need a majority
of votes in either chamber; they only needed enough to prevent an override of what was a
certain Reagan veto of the bill. The most natural place to look was towards segments of
the agriculture industry. The agriculture industry is highly diversified, with some sectors
more dependent on the export consumption of their product than others. With the
exception of cotton producers, most agricultural industries were located in small population states, and hence most Senators from these states were strongly anti-protectionist.
The retailers and agriculture sectors established an informal working alliance, in which
each emphasized its role in shoring up opposition to quotas in the respective chamber
where they wielded the most power. In the case of retail, that was the House of
Representatives, and in the case of agriculture, it was the Senate. The final override vote
was 276-149, falling short of the two-thirds required to override the president. Despite
the fact that the protectionist forces outmaneuvered the free traders in Congress by forging alliances with more industries and thus expanding their power base, the free traders
were ultimately victorious in sustaining the presidential veto.
Still, the protectionists gained from their efforts to enact an import quota bill.
Industries not only sought legislative benefits, they also sought to use Congress to pres-

6.

Personal interview with Nike lobbyist.
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sure or influence the administration in its negotiations with foreign trading partners. The
protectionists had enough clout in Congress to delay the veto override vote by eight
months. As one lobbyist for the apparel industry put it:
Everyone knew what the strategy was-us and our opponents. August 6 was
significant because the government was holding meetings with the big three
import countries to work out bilateral agreements limiting exports. The vote
would put pressure on the negotiators. It did help. The government negotiators told us the pressure of the override veto enabled them to negotiate better
agreements limiting increases in imports to one percent.
In this case, such pressure resulted in more favorable trade terms in multilateral trade
negotiations going on at the time.
With the advent of a new Congress in 1987, the protectionists set out to amass enough
votes to successfully override another presidential veto. To this end, they made a key
change in their coalition strategy by focusing on winning the support of an ally in the
retail coalition - agriculture. There had been political changes in agriculture states,
notably the replacement of four Republican farm state senators with Democrats from
North and South Dakota, North Carolina, and Georgia. The textile/apparel coalition set
out to divide and conquer by winning the support of agricultural sectors that were affected by imported goods. 7 Obviously, the job of the retail coalition was to hold on to these
members.
Consequently, the bulk of the changes to the 1985 bill that were incorporated into the
1987 bill occurred in the Senate. Newly elected Senator Tom Daschle (D-SD) stepped into
the debate and designed an amendment to win more farm state votes. 8 Senator Daschle
had credibility with the farm lobby because he voted against the textile bill twice when he
served in the House. He had an incentive to broker the deal because as a freshman senator, it gave him the chance to make his mark with a highly visible bill. The "Daschle"
amendment tied increases in U.S. exports of agriculture goods to an increase in the
import quota on textiles. According to Senator Daschle:
I opposed H.R. 1562, the textile quota legislation, when it was brought before
the House in 1985. It is important to note that S. 2662, the legislation before
the Senate, has been changed in a number of substantive ways over the concepts embodied in H.R. 1562. I had many reasons for my opposition to that
bill, the most important of which was the fact that it did not offer protection
against the possibility that textile exporting countries might retaliate by purchasing less U.S. agricultural exports. My amendment will provide an incentive for countries to increase their commercial purchases of U.S. agricultural
products and a disincentive for them to retaliate by deliberately purchasing
less U.S. agricultural products.. .with the inclusion of my amendment to protect agricultural exports from the prospects of retaliation, I will support the
passage of S. 2662. 9

7.
8.
9.

See Browne (1990) and Hansen (1991) for more discussion on the origins of economic and
regional divisions among agriculture based interest groups.
Currently the Democratic Leader in the Senate.
134 Cong. Rec. S12089-12090 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1988).
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For the first time in the debate over protectionism, House and Senate members from
farm states were offered an alternative to merely opposing textile and apparel quotas; they
could vote for the textile quota bill with the Daschle amendment because it provided
some protection against potential retaliation against U.S. agricultural exports. The revised
bill passed the House by a vote of 263-156, where it actually lost five votes, but it passed
the Senate by a vote of fifty-nine to thirty-six, with a net increase of five votes, all from
agriculture states. Again, President Reagan vetoed the bill, and again the free-trade coalition managed to sustain the veto, even with the loss of some agricultural sectors.
In 1990, the House and Senate considered the textile/apparel quota bill for the last
time. The bill passed the Senate by a vote of sixty-eight to thirty-two, a veto-proof majority. The Senate version of the bill was brought directly to the House floor, where it passed
on September 18, 1990, by a vote of 271-149. President Bush vetoed the bill and the
House failed to override the veto on October 10, 1990, by a vote of 275-152.
The cases of the 1985, 1988, and 1990 textile/apparel quota bills are illustrative of two
general elements of coalition building across industries. First, industries decide whether
to seek coalition partners, and who to ask to join them, based on their relative strengths
in the House and the Senate. This holds true for industries seeking protection from'
imports, and industries that seek open export markets and oppose protectionism.
Second, including an industry because it brings particular strength in one of the chambers can be politically costly because it can energize another industry to join the opposition. Just as Schattschneider (1960, 15) noted more than forty years ago, bringing in more
allies to any political battle raises the risk of increasing the costs of waging the battle,
which is in one sense what happened to the textile/apparel coalition. Moreover, it increases the uncertainty associated with policy outcomes in legislatures because it increases the
number of compromises that must be reached in order to enact legislation. Consequently,
industries must weigh the complete range of economic and political costs and benefits
when deciding whether to expand their geographic reach in Congress.

II. 1991-1996: Protectionist Coalition Disintegration and
Reduced Influence.
After the veto of the 1990 textile and apparel bill, the strong and tightly knit coalition
uniting fabric producers, apparel manufacturers, and labor unions began to disintegrate.
The American Apparel Manufacturers did not formally endorse the 1990 textile quota
bill. This apparent split between the apparel and textile industries reflected a wider and
deeper disagreement between apparel manufacturers and textile companies, and between
apparel manufacturers and unions. As a result, the change in economic structure within
industries altered the nature of coalition building across industries. Larger textile manufacturers became more competitive over the course of the late 1980s and early 1990s. At
the same time, domestic apparel manufacturers struggled, and devoted more of their production capacity to overseas facilities (Murray, 1995) particularly in the Caribbean.
Ultimately, this rift divided the protectionist coalition that had existed for nearly a
decade. The first division occurred between the textile industry (producers and labor)
and the apparel industry (producers) over the CBI, enacted in 1990. The CBI allowed
apparel manufacturers to assemble clothing and apparel in Caribbean Basin and Latin
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American countries and import the apparel with sharply reduced import duties, and no
import tariffs if the textiles were manufactured in the United States. One former Bush
administration staff member described the split this way:
The first major break [in the coalition] came before NAFTA; several years

before that. The CBI was a special regime that offered unlimited access of
apparel made out of U.S. fabric from the Caribbean. The apparel industry
wanted it but labor opposed it. NAFTA was the big publicly perceived issue
enunciating the break but in reality NAFTA would not have been possible
without the CBI ... On the CBI, the unions strongly opposed as did most fab-

ric producers, the apparel manufacturers pushed it ...
The apparel industry needed the CBI because it was becoming increasingly apparent
that they would have to move much of their production offshore to combat cheaper
imports (Murray, 1995). The economic condition of the apparel industry forced it to shift
its priorities from protectionism to increased export capacity. Subsequently, as larger textile producers became more efficient, they were able to compete both at home and
abroad, expanding their export markets. This created divisions between large and small
textile producers because the larger textile producers sought expansion of foreign markets, while the smaller producers sought protection from imports.
The split in the coalition came to a head in the battle over NAFTA. As one industry
lobbyist described it:
NAFTA is when things really fell apart. The apparel manufacturers essentially
sold out their workers ... But the minute they sold out their workers, they lost
all their power. The same is true of textiles, they supported NAFTA and lost
the unions so they lost their power.
This division in the textile/apparel coalition also spilled over to their methods of influencing the administration. Whereas the industry previously went to the administration as
a coalition and asked for similar trade benefits, they began to go to the administration
with separate and individual requests. In general, during the period 1991-1996, Congress
and the White House perceived the protectionist coalition as a weaker lobby than they
were in the 1980s, not just because they lost employment, but because they no longer
commanded the widespread cohesive geographic base that they once did. The former
Bush administration member cited above summed up the condition of the original textile
and apparel coalition this way:
Six years ago the industry would have been uniform and forceful in its desire
to see greater restrictions on imports, tighter enforcement and less liberal trade
policy. Today the domestic industry is split into various factions ... Primarily
large apparel manufacturers are investing offshore and producing goods there.
[But] within both fabric and apparel industries, you have manufacturers who
are still producing here who want restrictions. It is really an evolving issue.
Later there may be a complete and formal fracture. The industry basically can
no longer present a unified front.. .When you are fighting amongst yourselves
you are not always sure what image to present to Congress.

372

NAFTA: Law and Business Review of the Americas

In contrast, free-trade industries were trying to sustain their coalition and prevent the
same type of division. Because the supporters of NAFTA secured enough votes in the
Senate to pass the agreement, they focused their efforts on the House, where even the
addition of a few members of larger state delegations could secure passage. They did so by
emphasizing gains to specific industries in each district, sometimes even pitting traditional allies against each other. Free traders no longer pointed to the diffuse costs and benefits
associated with open trade but instead made a point of specifying job increases, industry
by industry, district by district. 10
The most striking evidence of the effects of a shift in industry politics is in the voting
behavior of House members from the Southeast, whose representatives had strongly supported protectionist quota bills in the past. Now, just three years after the last textile
quota bill passed the House, members from the Southeast were defecting, voting in support of NAFTA. The agreement passed the House on November 17, 1993 by a vote of 234200. In contrast, senators from the very same textile producing states continued to oppose
the expansion of free trade; however the Senate also passed NAFTA, by a vote of sixty-one
to thirty-eight on November 20, 1993 (See Figure 1). Despite the fact that the votes were
close, the textile/apparel coalition's broad base of geographic strength was greatly diminished and it lost the battle against free trade in Congress. The proponents of free trade
policy finally learned from their protectionist opponents about how to forge effective and
powerful coalitions using concrete economic and political benefits."I
At the same time however, a major shift was occurring in the agriculture industry's
majority position on free trade. Though the textile and apparel coalition succeeded in
winning some votes from agricultural states in the 1980s, they had not secured much support from the majority of states, which were major exporters of wheat. But by the early
1990s, farmers in states like Minnesota and Montana were disadvantaged by competition
from cheaper Canadian wheat, and began to feel the effects of the Canada Free Trade
Agreement. As a result, the protectionist coalition sought and gained new support from
senators in those states. In other words, the economic situation changed, making wheat
growers more inclined to support limitations on imports.12

10. For a discussion of district level conflicts over NAFTA, see David S.Cloud, Undecidedsare Final
Target in Battle over Trade Pact,CONG. Q. WKLY. REP. 3011-22 (1993).
11.

After winning NAFTA, the free-trade coalition was secure enough that no textile quota bill
could be enacted dissolving the original opposition group (RITAC) that formed in response to
the textile/apparel movement. The coalition itself did not disband, but being able to rely on a
free-trade majority in Congress and the White House, there was a reduced need for a formal
coordinating organization.
12. This shift by wheat farm states is more apparent in the 1994 vote on GATT, where several
members who shifted their votes used the opportunity to vote against GATT as a protest
against the influx of cheaper wheat. GATT is qualitatively different from NAFTA because the
debate focused more on ceding sovereignty to an international organization (WTO) rather
than specific unilateral trade actions or bilateral trade agreements.
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Figure 1
House vote on NAFTA
(by state delegation)
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III. 1997-2000: Rebuilding Protectionist Coalitions?
By 1997, the underlying politics of trade in Congress brought about a swing back
towards limited protectionist measures. A series of factors lead to this resurgence among
protectionist forces that in part can be attributed to changing economic conditions
among key members of the coalition. In particular, labor began a renewed push on behalf
of workers in the textile, apparel, and steel industries, and at the same time, smaller textile
producers were exerting pressure to protect what limited industries still remained in the
United States. Protection for textiles was not a partisan issue, despite the fact that the
Republican Party, which typically favors free trade, controlled Congress. Democrats and
Republicans from textile producing states and districts consistently supported quota bills
and other import limitations.
Congress considered three major trade initiatives in the 105th Congress that affected
the textile, apparel, retail, and agricultural sectors: an extension of the CBI, fast track
authority, and the Africa Free Trade bill. All three measures were caught up in the same
struggle for power between protectionists and free-trade coalitions. Consequently, when
President Clinton sought to reauthorize fast track negotiating authority in 1997, he faced
a different trade environment in the House and Senate than President Bush faced in 1991,
or even in 1993 and 1994. In fact, the textile industry had reconstructed its former
alliances without large manufacturers by holding on to apparel and textile workers, smaller producers, and adding more agricultural sectors.
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The extension of the CBI was brought to the House floor just one day before the
scheduled vote on fast track, and the contents of the debate on the floor revealed information about the impact of NAFTA on subsequent trade politics. In brief, the extension
of the CBI was designed to make Caribbean and Central American countries that were
not specifically included in the terms of NAFTA equal to Mexico. Thus, goods manufactured in these countries with U.S. produced textiles could be imported back duty-free,
and domestic textiles would receive reduced tariffs. Members rose to say that the negative
effects of NAFTA were reason enough to forestall further expansion of free trade benefits
to neighboring countries because of how easy it was for manufacturers to move production to those countries. 13 The old alliance of labor, in the form of apparel workers, and
textile producers reemerged to launch a successful fight against extending the CBI. These
industries added important strengths to the geographic strength of the coalition. The
coalition that formed around the CBI remained cohesive on the subsequent fast track bill,
which was reported by the Rules Committee on the same day that the House rejected the
CBI by a vote of 182-234 (See Figure 2). Subsequently, the House leadership decided to
postpone the vote on fast track and let the Senate act first. One retail lobbyist described it
this way, "The thing about Fast Track is that there was also a CBI bill that week - I think
on Tuesday and it was brought up under suspension which people don't like because it
rushes things. The CBI vote was a signaling vote for Fast Track."
Figure 2
House Vote on CB1 extension 1997
(by state delegation)

House vote on Fast Track (1998)
(by state delegation)

L4
Percent Delegation Support
C
0 - 25
26 - 50

51- 75
76- 100

13.

143 Cong. Rec. H9873-9881 (daily ed. Nov. 4, 1997).

Percent
Delegation Support
025
0--7
26 - 50

51 -75
S76 -100
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The Senate gave tacit approval for fast track to the president on a procedural vote of
sixty-nine to thirty-one on November 5, 1997.14 But the House, despite the Republican
majority, and having waited almost a full year after the Senate acted on it, defeated fast track
by a vote of 180-243 on September 25, 199815 (See Figure 3). A lobbyist for the agriculture
industry summed up the fallout from NAFTA and its effects on Fast Track and the CBI:
On this most recent Fast Track, things changed a bit. Sixty-five percent of the
members of the Farm Bureau thought they got a bad deal from NAFTA
because all the promises that were made did not happen. There was no grassroots effort behind fast track and the majority opposed it. The northern tier
states were being flooded by wheat from Canada and they realized they got a
bad deal. When the administration makes the argument, like in Fast Track,
that they need these things to negotiate treaties, well that doesn't fly because
the administration can negotiate arrangements with any country unilaterally
to sell more product.
Figure 3

Senate Vote on Fast Track 1997
(by state delegation)

Delegation Vote
Yes

INo
Split

House Vote on Fast Track (1998)
(by state delegation)

Percent Delegation Support
S0 - 25
26- 50
51 - 75
76- 100

14. The Senate never formally approved the fast-track legislation, but rather placed it on the
Senate calendar after a motion to invoke cloture on the bill passed by the vote of sixty-nine to
thirty-one. The vote was generally interpreted as the level of support that existed in the Senate
for fast track.
15. See Conley (1999) for a comprehensive model of roll call voting on Fast Track 1991 and 1997.
Controlling for ideology and party, regional differences emerge as an explanatory variable for
shift in support for fast track.
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The distribution of the votes on the CBI extension and fast track are similar and reflect
these divisions (See Figure 2). But there are slight differences in the patterns of opposition
to free trade. The split in apparel manufacturers, concentrated in the northeast, and
workers is apparent in the mixed support for the CBI extension from representatives in
the east. In contrast, members from agriculture districts and states appear less supportive
of the CBI and slightly more supportive of fast track, with the noted exception of northern tier states.
In between the CBI and fast track, the House considered a third trade initiative that
expanded trade benefits to textile and apparel products from designated countries in
Africa. The House version of the Africa Free Trade bill provided duty-free status to
imports from Africa, without the requirement that the products be assembled from U.S.produced textiles. The coalition that supported the Africa Free Trade bill was notably different because some members who normally supported protectionism favored this bill. In
particular, members of the Congressional Black Caucus from urban areas that usually
wanted to protect apparel jobs, and members from the south who wanted to protect textile jobs, e.g., John Lewis (D-GA), supported the Africa Trade bill. The House considered
the Africa Free Trade bill on March 11, 1998, and a motion to recommit the bill to add a
provision designed to protect textiles failed by a slim margin of 193-224. The bill ultimately passed by a vote of 233-186, but the Senate did not pass a companion measure. In
late March 1998, a retail industry (free trade) lobbyist assessed the balance of power
between the textile coalition and the importer-exporter coalition in the Senate and the
House in the following way:
In terms of raw numbers was a percentage of the body, we have better support
in the Senate. But the flip side of that is in the Senate, a few individuals can be
very powerful-Hollings, Thurmond they can beat you. Roth, he wavers on
free trade-sometimes he listens to Dupont on polyester and lines up with
Miliken and the textile people. The Fast Track vote in the Senate is about
where we are-sixty-nine to thirty-one. We can't get much beyond that.
In the House, the numbers are tighter .... look at the recent Africa legislation
to extend CBI [provisions] to African nations on textiles and apparel.... 126
Democrats and 66 Republicans voted to recommit the bill in order to [provide protection for textiles] gut the most important textile provision. We got
224 members to 193 but it was close. That vote shows that protectionism is
running rampant in the House now. That is the best indicator of where textiles stands right now. Ironically, the leadership in the House now is free trade
... and because of the Rules Committee, we can usually structure things to go
our way, but not always.
As Figures 2 and 3 imply, the distribution of support for textile protection seems to
have shifted once again and become numerically stronger in the House, which increases
the protectionists' reliance on industry workers (labor) in both Democratic and
Republican-controlled districts.
In 1999, the Africa Free Trade bill was reintroduced by Representative Phil Crane (RIL) with seventy-five cosponsors and considered on the House floor on July 16, 1999.
Once again, advocates for the textile industry tried to get the bill recommitted to the Ways
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and Means Committee, but they fell short. The bill passed the House by a vote of 234163. However, the bill to expand the CBI to more Caribbean nations was not brought to
the House floor because the leadership did not believe they had the votes to pass the bill.
In contrast, the Senate leadership felt confident that if they combined the Africa Free
Trade measure with the CBI bill, they could pass it in the Senate, and then send the combined measure back to the House for a vote. Senate advocates for the textile industry and
agriculture attached provisions to protect textiles by only extending duty free status to
apparel manufactured with U.S.-produced textiles. They also added provisions designed
to protect open markets for U.S. agricultural products. The combined Senate bill passed
on a vote of 76-19 on November 3, 1999 (See Figure 4).
Figure 4
House Vote on Africa Free Trade 1999
(by state delegation)

Percent Delegation Support
= 0 -25
26 - 50

51 - 75
76 -100

Senate Vote on Africa/CBI Free Trade 1999
(by state delegation)

Delegation Vote
Yes

No

Split

When the conferees met on the two bills, the clearest obstacle was the inclusion of the
CBI measure into the Senate version of the trade bill. But Senate leaders understood that
by presenting the House with a combined measure that also included some protection for
textiles, they might be able to overcome the House opposition to the extension of the
CBI. As Majority Leader Lott put it:
I worked a great deal with Charlie Rangel, the Congressman from NY, who
really wanted this. I remember a fateful meeting we had outside an elevator in
the Cannon Office Building at which I said, basically if you do Africa, we will
do CBI, and we will get together. And we did. 16

16. Cong. Rec. S3875-3876 (daily ed. May 11, 2000).
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Ultimately, the conferees agreed to a compromise measure that opened up trade with
Africa and extended trade benefits to a larger number of countries in the Caribbean and
Central America. Importantly, the bill retained the essential protectionist provision that
required imported goods from these regions to be assembled from material produced in
the United States. However, the protection was modified in the conference bill to allow
countries to use non-U.S. fabric (regionally produced) and still retain eligibility for dutyfree treatment in cases where the U.S. textile industry was not threatened or did not produce the material. Moreover, the bill includes a cap on overall imports from these regions.
Although this still benefits the textile producers because they retain their market share, it
does have the potential to cost U.S. textile workers their jobs, which is one stated reason
why a number of senators and representatives from textile states opposed the final trade
bill. The House passed the measure on May 4, 2000 by a vote of 309-110 and the Senate
passed it on May 11, 2000 by a vote of 77-19 (See Figure 5).
Figure 5
House Vote on Conference Report
on Africa Free TradeCB1 extension
(by state delegation)

Senate Vote on Conference Report
on Africa Free Trade/CBI extension
(by state delegation)

...
.
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The case studies of trade-related legislation presented above are specifically designed
to highlight the extent to which industries recognize the need to balance their respective
power in the House and Senate. Congressmen and senators react to economic interests
in their districts and states, and must balance those interests with their overarching party
and ideological stances. Industries recognize that their location and dispersion give them
advantages in one chamber or the other, and their goal in devising successful lobbying
strategies, either to win battles in Congress and/or to influence the administration, is to
find coalition partners that complement their strengths. Congressional leaders themselves acknowledge the different power bases that industries have in each chamber.
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Changing economic conditions, and the local impact of global or hemispheric trade
agreements, can have a strong ripple effect on the policy positions of local representatives and senators. Industries on both sides of the trade policy debate react by reshaping
their alliances accordingly.
The successful enactment of the extension of duty-free status to articles assembled in
the Caribbean and Central America has specific implications for any future expansion of
trade with Latin America. It establishes that such expansion is still possible, but that
strong protectionist forces persist in the House and Senate, and need to be accommodated in order for such an agreement to move forward. A potential complication for the
FTAA is that it will affect a wider range of industries, which brings different coalitions
into the fray in the House and Senate. One relevant and powerful industry that will be
affected by the FTAA, particularly with reference to Brazil, is the steel industry. The steel
industry has a strong and balanced political geography, and has not formed coalitions
with other industries over time, but has nonetheless managed to win administrative, and
more recently in the House, legislative protection. The discussion below focuses on the
bicameral and geographic strengths of the steel industry and illustrates why steel retains
its protectionist power.

IV. 1984-1990: Going Solo-The Case of Steel.
In the early 1980s, large producers dominated the steel industry, and it was primarily
concentrated in several medium and high population states: Indiana, Michigan, Ohio,
Illinois, and Pennsylvania. Overall, fifty-nine percent of steel production occurred in
these states. Unlike the textile industry, the steel industry had a more balanced political
geography. In the Senate, steel-producing states had both Republican and Democratic
senators who served as strong advocates. In the House, steel had the benefit of being
located in medium to large population states, with many districts represented by
Democrats and Republicans. An additional source of the power of the steel industry came
from its main union, the United Steel Workers. Not only did they represent all steelworkers, but they also represented workers in mining iron ore, copper, aluminum, chemical
facilities, and rubber. According to one steel union lobbyist:
Steel making is concentrated in the middle of the country but we are in every
congressional district. We have about 650,000 members nationwide ... The
geographic spread of our union ... gave more support to the steel movement
than from just the geographic concentration of just steelworkers. We can get
our members of other industries [in our union] to write their members in
support of our efforts.
The political strength of the steelworkers union therefore spreads beyond the exact
number of states that have steel producers.
As the steel industry began to endure severe competition from imported steel, it organized caucuses in the House and Senate to address the problem of cheap imported steel
coming into the United States. As one steel industry lobbyist explained:

380

NAFTA: Law and Business Review of the Americas

The members of Congress representing steel districts formed a caucus. In the
House it was Fred Rooney, Jack Murtha and Ralph Regula. It was bipartisan.
In the Senate, it was Jay Rockefeller, Dick Lugar, Arlen Specter and John
Heinz. Each chamber had its own caucus. The steel companies, US Steel,
Bethlehem Steel and LTV educated the members-or tried to educate themon the issues. The caucuses were a way to send a message to the administration and Commerce [Department] to act on AD/CVD [anti-dumping and
countervailing duties] issues.
The backing of a state with a large number of House districts and states with bipartisan distributions enables the steel industry to amass crucial political support in both
chambers without having to form broader coalitions with other industries. In addition,
the timing of the steel industry's battles often coincides with looming presidential races,
which also enhances the power of their geographic location.
The story of the 1984 steel quota bill illustrates the strategy that the steel industry,
defined as the steelworkers and the steel companies, employed to secure legislative protection in the 1980s. It also serves as a very useful comparison to the steel import quota bill.
of 1999, which passed the House of Representatives despite the fact that steel industry
employment was far lower than it was in 1984. Since the early 1908s, the steel industry
used trade law (antidumping provisions) to try to counter the surge of imported steel
coming from Europe and Japan. In 1984, the steel industry filed a case under Section 201,
seeking an International Trade Commission (ITC) ruling that imports were causing
injury to the U.S. steel industry. A steel union lobbyist described their strategy:
The question arose as to whether we should seek relief from Congress. Things
were so severe in terms of imports, would the filing under Section 201, which
is global, not country by country, be enough? Remember that relief under
Section 201 is at the President's discretion. We considered two things. Could
we get Congress to help and could we get it passed? And, would it be a stimulant to the President if we won our case, would he then act?
It was in this context that Senator Heinz introduced a bill, S. 2380, to limit foreign steel
producers to fifteen percent of the U.S. market (Pressman 1984, 1987). The bill eventually
collected eighteen Senate co-sponsors and 201 House co-sponsors. Despite the disparity
in co-sponsorship between the House and Senate, the steel industry was stronger in the
Senate in many ways. It was the threat that Senator Heinz, a Republican, would offer the
bill on any trade legislation coming through the Finance Committee, and later on the
Senate floor, that kept the pressure on the administration to address the steel industry's
complaints.
In June 1984, the ITC ruled that foreign imports had injured the steel industry, and
recommended quotas and tariffs on imported steel. In September, President Reagan
rejected the quota recommendations, but did express willingness to use voluntary export
agreements with steel producing nations to limit the amount of steel imported into the
United States to twenty percent of the U.S. market (Green, 1984, 2295-2296). Much of his
decision was attributed to the fact that the Senate was simultaneously considering a general trade bill that passed the House in 1983. Senator Heinz then had the opportunity to
add the quota bill or some version of it to the House trade bill, either in the Finance
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Committee or on the Senate floor. Knowing this, President Reagan undermined Heinz's
potential support for more protectionist provisions by agreeing to limit imports through
voluntary export arrangement. Ultimately, the Senate Finance Committee added several
important provisions pertaining to foreign trade barriers and Heinz secured provisions
that enhanced the Customs Service's ability to monitor steel imports. However, none of
these provisions were as severe as the original steel import quota bill. The steel industry
used their geographic strength in the House and Senate to pressure the administration
into granting relief to them.
Throughout the remainder of the 1980s, the steel industry continued to use its clout in
both the House and Senate to secure favorable administrative relief. At the same time, the
underlying economics of the steel industry was changing because more efficient and
smaller steel producers (mini-mills) were emerging as a political force. Because they were
more competitive, they were not as strong advocates for import protection as the larger
producers. However, they did not succeed in overcoming the stronger influence that large
steel producers had with their representatives and senators because they were located in
many of the same areas.

V. 1991-1996: Maintaining Industry Influence.
In contrast to the textile and apparel industries, steel maintained its political strength in
Congress and with the Administration in the early to mid- 1990s. The steel industry continued to work primarily through the Administration, and because it has always maintained
close ties to both parties, it did not face a severe diminution in its influence with the changing of Administrations in 1992. A steel industry lobbyist summed it up this way:
We look at the players who can get things done for us. We are always in communication with the administration/USTR/Commerce. We are very close
already... you want to continuously shore up support in the House and
Senate... We are still filing anti-dumping petitions and unfair trade practice
complaints. We really don't seek legislation now, enforcement is more important to us.
One important element to their sustained political strength, even in the face of declining employment, is the unity between management and labor. One Senate staff member
put it this way, "You look at steel, Bob Lighthouser and Alan Wolf [lobbyists for steel
companies] never broke ranks with [steel] labor on trade. They have stayed strong. Their
employment has plummeted but they are still powerful."
Although their relationship is not always perfect, the management-labor alliance in the
steel industry weathered issues like NAFTA and GATT better than textiles and apparel
primarily because the domestic industry is not adversely affected. One stqel union lobbyist described the NAFTA and GATT battles as they pertained to the steel industry:
On NAFTA, the steel companies supported it. The steelworkers, in solidarity
with the AFL-CIO, were anti-NAFTA. The battle against NAFTA was a symbolic means to express deep discontent against the system which deprived
[workers] of wage increases... we were not seeing business go south, that did
not happen in the steel industry.. .We finish a lot of Mexican steel products
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so the Mexican steel does not really threaten us. [On GATT] we did not take a
hard position ... As far as we were concerned, it had relatively little impact on
the steel industry. Steel tariffs were relatively low anyhow.

Despite the fact that the steelworkers differed from management on these trade agreements, the differences were more due to their individual allegiances to labor and business
rather than steel specific disagreements. One Administration staff member described a
recent battle in which steel had emerged the victor:
There is a group lobbying on the short supply antidumping issue. That is the
provision that says that we don't have to apply antidumping rules to industries whose products are in short supply in the U.S. The people who use
something like steel for example want this policy. But obviously it is seen as
undermining the steel industry which hates this short supply provision. The
people who want short supply have absolutely no clout in the Senate. The
steel industry is too powerful there.
Because the steel industry has not suffered a major split that would dilute its geographic power in the House or Senate, it can actively lobby in a coherent and unified fashion
for administrative, and if necessary, legislative protection.

VI. 1997-2000: Renewing the Call for Legislated Import Protection.
In recent years, the steel industry faced renewed strong economic competition from
cheaper imported steel, because there were a greater number of countries producing and
exporting steel to the United States. In response to the influx of cheaper imported steel,
the industry greatly increased its petitions for relief with the Department of Commerce
and the ITC. Just as they did in 1984 and 1985, the steel industry mobilized its representatives and senators to exert more pressure on the administration. On March 4, 1999,
Representative Peter Visclosky (D-IN) introduced H.R. 975, the Steel Import Limitation
Bill, with 204 co-sponsors (recall the 1984 bill had 201 co-sponsors in the House). The
bill "directs the President to impose quotas, tariff surcharges, or negotiate enforceable voluntary export restraint agreements in order to ensure that the volume of imported steel
products ... during any month does not exceed the average volume of imported steel for
the thirty-six months period preceding July 1997."17 It passed the House by a vote of 289141 on March 17, 1999 (See Figure 6).
In the Senate, Senator Jay Rockefeller (D-WV) introduced a companion measure, and
Senator Arlen Specter (R-PA) sponsored a milder measure. The Senate took up the House
bill on June 18th, and Majority Leader Trent Lott immediately filed a cloture motion to
thwart a possible filibuster of the bill by free-trade advocates (though Lott himself
expressed opposition to the bill). A cloture vote was held on the bill on June 22, 1999, and
it failed by a vote of forty-two to fifty-seven, with a pro-cloture vote equal to a vote in
support of steel import quotas (See Figure 5). Despite the failure to invoke cloture, no bill
in support of protection against imports had received as many as forty-two votes since
the last time the Senate passed the textile quota in 1990.

17.

Legislative language (see 145 Cong. Rec. H1349 (daily ed. Mar. 17. 1999)).
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Figure 6
Senate Vote to Invoke Cloture
on Steel Import Quota Bill 1999
(by state delegation)

House Vote on Steel Import Quotas 1999
(by state delegation)
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Strikingly, the steel industry continues to "go solo" and has not actively sought out
other industries to forge protectionist coalitions. The Steel Import Limitation bill provides no other import relief to any other industry, once again demonstrating the perception of the steel industry that it need not formally seek out other coalition partners to
enhance its power in the House or Senate. And when we look at the geography of the
vote, it is clear that the steel industry continues to benefit from its concentration in medium to large population states that are competitively bipartisan, and from its longstanding
association with labor.18 But what is also clear is that steel underestimates the power of
some sectors of the agriculture industry as potential coalition partners, especially in the
Senate. On the one hand, agriculture prefers open markets in order to export as much as
possible abroad. However, when faced with competition from geographically contiguous
nations, some sectors of the agriculture industry defect and join forces in support of protectionist trade policies. As noted earlier, senators from northern-tier Canadian borderstates joined with those voting for steel import quotas, but senators from more southern
farm states, such as Kansas, opposed them (See Figure 6). Proponents for import protections might think more strategically about including regionally targeted provisions for
the agriculture industry in order to solidify the support of a greater number of agriculture crop sectors, and thus attract wider support from farm state senators.
18. An EPIC/MRA poll taken on behalf of the Association of Women in International Trade in
May, 1999 found that almost half (forty-nine percent) of Republican respondents and forty-six
percent of Democratic respondents favored import quota legislation, revealing little differences
in partisan views on steel imports.
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But the bottom line for steel is that it gets results without having to incur the costs of
adding coalition partners. In response to the 1999 congressional votes on the steel import
quota bill, the Clinton administration subsequently agreed to impose tariffs worth about
$410 million on imported steel from South Korea, Brazil, Germany, and Japan. 19 In addition, the administration promised to work out a voluntary agreement with Russia, which
has also been exporting cheaper steel to the United States. This action mirrors actions
taken by President Reagan in 1985 after Senator Heinz threatened to offer a steel import
quota bill as an amendment on the Senate floor. In other words, congressional action has
always been a signal to the administration, and in 1999, the steel industry successfully
managed to secure its most credible threat in two decades.

VII. Conclusion.
The cases of industry strategy outlined in this paper over the period 1984-2000 illustrate two important facets of the effect of bicameral institutions on lobbying strategy in
trade politics. First, industries view their overall strength in terms of their location in
House districts and states, and they take into consideration how that translates into
power in the House and Senate separately. In other words, they do not simply view themselves as associated with a party or a single advocate; instead, they assess their relative
strength in both chambers as a combination of location, advocacy, and partisan distribution. Second, industries are acutely aware of the different procedural mechanisms that
govern the two chambers and the powers associated with them. These two facets of
bicameral legislatures are key to understanding why and when trade-sensitive industries
seek out other industry coalition partners.
Using this approach to anticipate future trade policy towards the Americas provides sev-

eral insights into potential problems with expanding free trade agreements. Free trade initiatives, such as the attempt to give the president renewed fast-track authority and the bill to
extend the CBI, were both hurt by the fallout from NAFTA. The retail and apparel freetrade coalition could not amass enough support for these measures in the House of

Representatives in part because textiles courted agricultural interests, especially northern
farm states and districts, who had been adversely affected by NAFTA and were therefore
reluctant to extend free trade further. The Africa Free Trade bill narrowly escaped the same

fate in the House, but a core group of supporters, the Congressional Black Caucus, added a
constituency dimension to the free-trade coalition that was not necessarily tied to any specific trade benefit that would accrue to U.S. interests. The CBI extension ultimately passed

because it was combined with Africa Free Trade in the Senate, where key textile state sena-

19. Joseph Kahn, Clinton Imposes Tariffs on Steel Imports That Exceed Quota, N.Y. TiMES, Feb. 12,
2000, at C2. In response to Clinton's action, Brazil filed a complaint against the United States
with the World Trade Organization (Pressman, 1984, 1897). The bill eventually collected eighteen Senate co-sponsors and 201 House co-sponsors. Despite the disparity in co-sponsorship
between the House and Senate, in many ways the steel industry was stronger in the Senate. It
was the threat that Senator Heinz, a Republican, would offer the bill on any trade legislation
coming through the Finance Committee, and later on the Senate floor, that kept the pressure
on the administration to address the steel industry's complaints.
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tors also included specific provisions benefiting the domestic textile manufacturing industry. The ultimate success of the CBI extension is attributable more to bicameralism and the
free-trade orientation of the Senate than it is to free trader strength in the House.
The success of the steel industry in securing passage of a steel import quota bill from a
Republican majority House and securing forty-two votes in the Senate is also an indication that we must not pronounce protectionism dead in Congress just yet. Negotiators of
the FTAA need to recognize that industry geography generates localized constituency
pressures that interact with the bicameral structure of the Congress. In combination,
these structural forces create opportunities for industries seeking protection to overcome
partisan and ideological policy positions on free trade. The wide range of industries that
would be affected by the FTAA includes textiles, steel, poultry, and large agricultural sectors such as citrus and tomatoes. The agriculture industry already responded in part to
the negative effects of cheaper wheat, and citrus growers located in highly populated
states such as Florida and California are likely to lobby heavily for protection. One potential coalition could form between wheat growers in sparsely populated states that wield
power in the Senate, and the citrus and vegetable growers who are located in large population states that wield a great deal of power in the House. In order to counter such a
coalition, free traders would have to form alternative counter coalitions with other agriculture producers and export-based trade industries seeking open markets.
Future advocates of extending free trade in terms of granting lower tariffs or duty-free
status to a wider range of countries in Latin America must stay cognizant of the geographical balance of power among trade-sensitive industries within the House and the
Senate, respectively. They must also monitor the ever-changing coalitions that form
among them to enhance their strengths in both chambers.
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